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IN MY VIEW
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AT SEA
Sir:
I was pleased to see Thomas Mahnken’s piece on asymmetric warfare and the
battles off Guadalcanal [“Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off
Guadalcanal, 1942–1943” in the Winter 2011 issue of the Naval War College Re-
view, pp. 95–121]. Dr. Mahnken makes a number of worthwhile points, and his
conclusions about the importance of integrating technology with tactics and
operational concepts are well founded; these are very important and valuable
lessons.
The article could have been considerably strengthened by more effective use
of primary-source material or more recent secondary sources. Although Dr.
Mahnken’s conclusions are generally sound, the Navy’s preparations for night
combat prior to the battles of Guadalcanal are far more sophisticated than is
generally believed, and the reasons for failure correspondingly more compli-
cated. In order to understand adequately the lessons of Guadalcanal, it is neces-
sary to examine these preparations in more detail.
As Dr. Mahnken points out, the Navy prepared for a campaign in the Pacific
that would culminate in a decisive daylight fleet action. However, the Navy also
recognized the potential of night torpedo attacks and, rather than shying away
from such actions, actively practiced them. The “Night Search and Attack,” an
established tactic of using destroyers to seek out and attack enemy formations at
night with guns and torpedoes, dates back at least to 1921.1 The records associ-
ated with the development of these tactics illustrate that while the main fleet,
and particularly the battle line, was instructed to avoid night action, light forces
were encouraged to seek it out.
Through much of the interwar period, night search-and-attack procedures
were relatively unsophisticated. Destroyers often attacked individually or in
small groups; coordinated action proved to be difficult.2 Continued practice
paid dividends, however, and by 1937 a new set of procedures had begun to
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emerge. Fleet Problem XVIII of that year saw a series of well-coordinated and
successful attacks; the doctrine employed in those exercises was refined and in-
tegrated into a new and more thorough set of doctrinal publications describing
the procedures for night search and attack.3
By the eve of war, the Navy had a set of procedures that rivaled that of the Jap-
anese in terms of complexity and sophistication. New formations had been in-
troduced, the “Vee” and the “Wedge,” for the cooperation of cruisers and
destroyers at night. Both of these formations placed cruisers in the van; their
firepower would be employed to penetrate an enemy screen. The destroyers be-
hind them, arranged in three parallel columns, would charge through the gap
and attack the enemy ships at the center of the formation with gunfire and tor-
pedoes.4 Neither of these formations was linear; like the Japanese, the U.S. Navy
recognized the limitations of long linear columns at night.
Why then were these procedures not employed off Guadalcanal? Admiral
Nimitz asked as much in his comments on the battle of 12–13 November 1942.5
They were part of the existing doctrine, yet none of the task force commanders
off Guadalcanal used them. It is impossible to understand fully the Navy’s fail-
ures without answering this question.
In order to do so, we must first examine the process for developing task force
doctrine in 1942. The Navy had developed sophisticated plans and procedures
for large battles, termed “Major Tactics” in the doctrinal publications of the
time. It left “Minor Tactics” in the hands of individual task force commanders.
They were expected to develop specific tactics for their forces, corresponding to
their capabilities and the likely enemy forces they would encounter.6
This is exactly what happened off Guadalcanal. The linear formation with de-
stroyers attached closely to the van and rear of the cruiser line was the brainchild
of Admiral Scott, who employed it successfully at the battle of Cape Esperance.
Scott departed from existing doctrine primarily because of the risks of friendly
fire.7 Fratricide had been a repeated problem in prewar exercises and had been
narrowly avoided in the battle of Savo Island. Unfortunately, the linear
formation did not succeed in this regard, and it was quickly—and appropriately
—discarded after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.8
Absorbing lessons from earlier actions, Admiral Kinkaid developed a plan
prior to the battle of Tassafaronga specifying that his destroyers were to operate
out ahead of the cruisers in a separate formation and use radar to get into torpedo-
firing position.9 It fell to Admiral Wright to execute Kinkaid’s plan, and although
it did not go well, he stuck with the concept of not employing a single column
and sent his van destroyers out ahead.
The approach of relying on task force commanders to develop specific doc-
trines and procedures explains many of the issues encountered in the battles off
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Guadalcanal. In most battles, the ships were thrown into battle without ade-
quate time to develop plans or doctrines. These forces were “scratch teams,”
hastily cobbled together to repulse Japanese advances. They lacked cohesion and
were unable to train together for significant periods of time. The critical failure
was not a lack of sophisticated procedures or doctrine but rather a breakdown of
peacetime organizational structure under the pressures of a two-front war,
which disrupted unit cohesion.10
However, Scott’s departure from existing doctrine also illustrates why the
Navy was able to adapt so quickly to new procedures, like the successful ap-
proaches of Admiral Merrill and Commander Burke. As unit cohesion increased
and greater time was provided for training formations as a unit before battle, the
flexible nature of doctrinal development combined with the initiative of indi-
vidual task force commanders to allow the best procedures to come to the fore.
Similar flexibility led to the rapid introduction and adoption of vastly improved
procedures for the integration of radar into tactical doctrine, in the form of new
gunnery procedures and the CIC.
What Merrill and Burke recognized, and potentially Kinkaid before them,
was that destroyers could use modern radars to approach torpedo-firing posi-
tion and, if they held fire with their guns, devastate enemy formations before
their presence was discovered. The major doctrinal change was waiting to open
fire with guns until the torpedoes had found their mark. This was not practiced
before the war, because in prewar exercises the destroyers’ torpedo targets were
the heavy ships at the center of enemy formations. To get to them, the destroyers
would have to use their guns to penetrate the enemy screen; there was no way for
them to conceal their approach.11 But this assumption did not hold in the
Solomons in 1943, and tactics appropriately changed.
Dr. Mahnken has correctly recognized the flexibility inherent in the Navy’s
doctrinal approach, but it deserves more attention, particularly for the part it
played not only in the victories of 1943 but also in the failures of 1942. The two
are inexorably linked. Without the ability to allow task force commanders to de-
velop their own doctrines, accounting for their forces and individual circum-
stances, the Navy would not have been able to leverage its technological
advantages as quickly as it did. However, this very same flexibility forced on indi-
vidual commanders a reliance that they were unprepared to meet under the
pressures of a global war in late 1942. This factor, more than any other, is to
blame for the failures off Guadalcanal.12
The implications of this are very important and go beyond how best to inte-
grate technology, tactics, and force structure. The solution the Navy introduced
is worth describing. While still encouraging flexibility and individual initiative,
the Pacific Fleet developed in 1943 a more detailed doctrinal manual that
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outlined the best approaches for combat with small units, as well as large ones.
This was Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet, or PAC 10, of
June 1943. It provided a “playbook” that would allow commanders who lacked
the time or ability to develop their own procedures to employ set plans for battle.
This approach was adopted by the entire Navy with the publication of Current
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, USF 10A, in February 1944. With these
documents the wartime Navy discovered a harmonious balance of flexibility
and standardization that allowed success in the Pacific War.13
TRENT HONE
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CAPTAINS OF THE SOUL
Sir:
In his article “Captains of the Soul: Stoic Philosophy and the Western Profession
of Arms in the Twenty-First Century” [Naval War College Review, Winter 2011,
pp. 31–58], Dr. Michael Evans, in what might be regarded as overkill, cites the
Old Testament, the Alcoholics Anonymous “Serenity Prayer,” the TV series Star
Trek, Latin quotes, the poems “Invictus” and “Ulysses,” and other poetry and po-
ets and novels and novelists, Albert Einstein, the pleasure-loving, self-indulgent
Winston Churchill, ancient Greek philosophers, and many other persons and
sources, so numerous it would be tedious to list them by name, on behalf of the
contention that modern Western professional military officers could use Stoic
philosophy to deal with “an asymmetric enemy who abides by a different set of
cultural rules,” i.e., the Muslims in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. Current behavioral values, Evans claims, place Westerners at a disad-
vantage when fighting followers of Islam, who follow cultural imperatives based
on a strict code of honor.
But Evans, in spite of all his sundry citations, fails to provide even one exam-
ple of how on the field of battle in counterinsurgency warfare, or in trying to win
the hearts and minds of contested populations, the unreformed, unrecon-
structed honor code of Islam (which, for example, to protect family honor re-
quires the male relatives of a woman who has been raped through no fault of her
own to murder her, and which requires that Muslim girls in a burning building
must remain inside and die if they are not properly attired to go outside) places
Muslims at an advantage and Western militaries and Western democracies at a
disadvantage in asymmetric warfare. Evans says an erosion of public honor in
Western term societies has impacted upon “the Western military’s professional
ethics and its institutional notions of duty and sacrifice” [page 33]. But he cites
no example of how this has manifested itself in the actual conduct of counterin-
surgency by Western professional military officers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
only military problem that Evans describes in his article proposing the adoption
of Stoic philosophy by Western professional military officers is that of neuropsy-
chiatric disorders among 20% of U.S. service members—not just officers—who
have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Evans doesn’t disclose what part of
that 20% affected are officers and what percent of all officers are affected.
Evans has not demonstrated how these “invisible wounds of war,” post–
traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), and depression, which are the result of hav-
ing served in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been the actual causes of specific disad-
vantages U.S. forces have experienced during the conduct of operations in those
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two countries. Let’s keep in mind that the “post” in post–traumatic stress disor-
der means “after,” “subsequent,” “later.”
Evans admits that there are “fundamental gaps” regarding the causality of
military mental-health problems. Yet he cites the opinions of an American bri-
gadier general, who is not an expert in psychology, and a military philosopher,
who is also no expert in psychology, that Stoic characteristics could be of value
in combating combat stress—not post–traumatic stress disorder and depres-
sion. These unsubstantiated opinions don’t support Evans’s contention about
the adoption of Stoic philosophy by military officers. He doesn’t even show that
stress in combat is always necessarily dysfunctional and counterproductive.
In closing, I would like to point to an observation by the ancient Athenian or-
ator and statesman Pericles in his funeral oration over the Athenians killed
fighting Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Although the Spartans may not have
had an intricately developed system of Stoic philosophy, they were certainly stoi-
cal in how they lived. “Unlike the Spartans, we do not harden ourselves with a
stern and harsh discipline beginning in childhood. On the contrary, we live as we
please and take a pleasurable exercise whenever it suits us to do so.” Yet this dif-
ference in lifestyles did not seem to put the Athenians at a disadvantage when
facing the Spartans in battle.
JOSEPH FORBES
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